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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Financial Crisis, a common narrative casts the
largest, too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks as villains1 and community
banks 2 as darlings. 3 On the one hand is the image of the infamous
mega banks that brought the economy to its knees and continue to
profit while the rest of society sputters, and on the other hand is
the angelic community banker (think Jimmy Stewart in It's a
Wonderful Life) working tirelessly to provide the last bastion of
hope for small, job-creating, businesses and other worthy
borrowers. Advocates for these innocent small banks point to the
crushing regulatory burden imposed on institutions that had
nothing to do with the crisis. 4 Accordingly, the considerable
political power of community banks 5 has been harnessed in a press
for regulatory relief.6 These advocates predict the demise of
1 See, e.g., The Originsof the FinancialCrisis:Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/node/21584534/print (arguing that financiers at big banks caused
the Financial Crisis by issuing an abundance of irresponsible home loans, turning them into
pools of securitizing, and transferring them to large banks where the securitized mortgages
eventually set off a negative chain reaction when United States housing prices tumbled).
2 This Article generally uses the term "community bank" in a non-technical sense, i.e., to
refer to smaller institutions that are distinguishable from larger regional and multinational
banks. Part II includes a brief discussion of various technical definitions for community
banks. This Article does not seek to discover or explain the line-drawing involved in
determining whether a small or smaller institution is, in fact, a community bank.
3 See, e.g., Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis Regarding Community Banks:
Hearingon Examining the Major Trends Affecting Community Banks and Lessons Learned
from Community Bank Failures During the Financial Crisis Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (Statement of Sen. Tim Johnson,
Chair, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs) ("We know that community banks did
not cause the financial crisis, but many were casualties of the Great Recession that
followed.").
4 See Stephen Moore, Editorial, The Demise of the Small American Bank, WALL ST. J.
(July 31, 2015, 8:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-demise-of-the-small-american-ba
nk-1438382060 ('The [regulatory] burdens get so intense that it is destroying the small[-]
and medium-size banks in America." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
5 See BARNEY FRANK, FRANK: A LIFE IN POLITICS FROM THE GREAT SOCIETY TO SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE 314 (2015) (discussing the political power of grassroots organizations like
community banks).
6 See Robert Blackwell, The Easy Legislative Fix that Could Save Community Banks,
AM. BANKER (Fed. 23, 2015, 2:26 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulatio
n/the-easy-legislative-fix-that-could-save-community-banks- 1072855-1.html?zkPrintable=tr
ue ("Small banks are currently lobbying Congress for regulatory relief ... ").
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community and other small banks if the regulatory burden is not
lifted. 7 Some view such predictions with a more skeptical eye and
suggest that the interests of large banks are behind community
bank reform proposals. These critics claim that the big banks are
attempting to slip under the community bank halo with the hope
8
of less regulation for all banks-big and small.
Even if much of the hand-wringing on behalf of community
banks is a disguise for big banks' efforts at deregulation, reason for
concern regarding the state of community banks remains. Small
banks have been disappearing for quite some time.9 The demise of
community banks is troubling because of the unique services they
provide to certain borrowers and communities. 10 Therefore, efforts
to promote and preserve community banks are well-founded. Yet,
community banks pose many of the same extrinsic risks to the
economy as their larger counterparts (albeit on a much smaller
scale). For example, the failure of savings and loan associations in
the 1980s was the source of the larger banking crisis that

7 See Moore, supra note 4 (arguing that "community banks are disappearing" as a result
of regulatory burden).
8 Senator Elizabeth Warren made this observation at a Senate Banking Committee
hearing on regulatory reform: 'We should be very skeptical of regulatory relief bills that are
promoted as helping small banks but are pushed by ABA lobbyists for the big banks." Kevin
Cirilli, Warren: Community Banks Thriving under Dodd-Frank,THE HILL (Feb. 12, 2015, 1:25
PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://thehill.com/policy/financelbanking-financial-in
stitutions/232637-warren-community-banks-thriving-under-dodd. Dennis Kelleher, President
and CEO of Better Markets, Inc., recently observed: "The cornerstone of the industry's PR
strategy is to claim that their megabanks are just like all the other banks in the United
States, and that those who support reducing Wall Street's dangerous practices are 'bank
bashing', 'beating up on the industry, or 'hammering the banks."' Dennis M. Kelleher, Why
Presidential Candidates Are Talking About the Unique Threat Posed by Wall Street's
Megabanks, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2015, 5:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlden
nis-m-kelleher/why-presidential-candidates b7587056.html.
9 Various statistics support this claim. For example, from 1984 to 2011, "the number of
banks with assets less than $25 million declined by 96 percent." FDIC, COMMUNITY
BANKING STUDY, at I (2012) [hereinafter FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY], https://www.
From 1985 to 2010, "the number of banks
fdic.gov/regulations/resources/cbi/study.html.
under $10 billion in assets and credit unions declined by over 50 percent ... " U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-881, COMMUNITY BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS: IMPACT OF
THE DODD-FRANK ACT DEPENDS LARGELY ON FUTURE RULE MAKINGS (2012), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648210.pdf.
10 See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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followed.1 1 In any financial crisis, smaller institutions often fail
and their failure triggers government support. 12 While they are
not important enough to the overall economy to justify the
headline bailouts available to large financial institutions,
community banks suffer from many of the same conditions that
contribute to the instability of TBTF institutions. For example,
community banks' balance sheets exhibit the same sort of
precariousness as those of the large institutions. 13 Moreover,
community banks are highly leveraged and their assets have
longer maturities than their liabilities. The justification for
extensive regulation of community banks rests on a recognition of
the financial fragility of institutions that play an important role in
the communities they serve.
Thus, calls for scaling back the regulatory burden imposed on
community banks do not offer ready solutions. This Article
examines the current calls for deregulation and balances those
ideas against the long history of community bank regulation,
insolvency, and government support.
Part II discusses the
benefits offered by community banks and the current status of the
industry. Part III outlines the justification for community bank
regulation and the availability of the government safety net to
support these institutions. Part IV addresses the solvency risk of
community banks-their rates of failure and the causes of their
failure. Part V addresses the reaction by community banks and
their supporters to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)1 4 and links
those discussions to the broad and continuing purpose for the
regulation of community banks.

" See George Kaufman, The U.S. Banking Debacle of the 1980s: A Lesson in Government
Mismanagement, Freeman, FOUND. ECON. EDUC. (Apr. 1, 1995), http://fee.org/freeman/theus-banking-debacle-of-the-1980s-a-lesson-in-government-mismangement/ (noting the costs
of bank failures in the 1980s including the failure of savings and loan associations, which
imposed high costs on the surviving financial institutions, including large banks).
12 See, e.g., id. (noting how the federal government responded to the failure of small
savings and loan associations in 1991 by enacting the FDIC Improvement Act).
13 See infra Part III (discussing balance sheet fragility).
14 Pub. L. No. 113-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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II. WHAT ARE COMMUNITY BANKS AND WHY Do THEY MATTER?

Community banks are often identified by and praised for their
distinctive business model. 15 As discussed below, they utilize a
relationship approach as opposed to the transactional approach
favored by larger institutions. Community banks are also often
identified by their asset size. One billion dollars or less in assets
has been used to define community banks. 16 More recently, ten
17 Of
billion dollars or less in assets has served as the benchmark.
course, designations based on asset size have many limitations,
not the least of which is that such definitions do not capture the
activities associated with community banking.' 8
In its 2012
Community Banking Study, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)1 9 utilized a comprehensive approach toward
defining community banks which incorporated not only asset size
but also a consideration of asset type (e.g., banks that specialize in
credit card lending are excluded) and whether the bank engages in
traditional lending and deposit-taking. 20 The FDIC's definition
also includes geographic limitations to serve as a proxy for
relationship banking. 21 Using its definition, the FDIC reported
that 94% of the 6,914 United States banking organizations in 2010
22
were community banks.

15 See FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 9, at I ("The value of community
banks has always been associated with the unique combination of services they provide to
their customers, as well as the manner in which they do business.").
16 See id.
17 See id. at 1-1.
18 See id. at 1-2.
19 The FDIC is the primary federal regulator for most community banks. It also provides
deposit insurance for all banks. The other federal bank regulators are the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve
System (Federal Reserve).
20 See FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 9, at 1-1 to 1-5 (detailing the
FDIC's approach to determining what constitutes a community bank).
21 The study explains: 'This [geographic] limitation of scope is used as a proxy measure
for a bank's relationship approach to banking. Banks that operate within a limited market
area have more ease in managing relationships at a personal level." Id. at 1-3.
22 jd.
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The societal benefits of community banks are wellThe relationship approach allows community
documented. 23
banks to effectively lend to customers on the basis of confidential
or opaque information that does not stand up to the credit score or
other modeling approaches of larger institutions. 24 This means
that community banks offer lending services that are not always
available elsewhere. In their study of community banks, Marsh
and Norman found:
Community banks are more focused than larger banks
on core financial services, demonstrated in their
disproportionate involvement in key activities....
[C]ommunity banks hold only 14.2 percent of total

23

See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, U.S. FED. RESERVE SYS., COMMUNITY

BANKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 5 (2013),

available at https://www.stlouisfed.org/-/medialFiels/PDFsBanking/CBRC-2013/town-hall.
pdf ("Community banks are a critical component of our country's financial system and
economy. They creatively meet a diverse array of consumer and commercial credit needs
and are important partners in the economic stability of their communities."); TANYA D.
MARSH & JOSEPH W. NORMAN, AM. ENTER. INST., THE IMPACT OF DODD-FRANK ON
COMMUNITY BANKS 1 (2013), available at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/201/05/th
e-impact-of-doddfrank-on-community-banks_164334553537.pdf ("Community banks play a
vital role in this nation's economy, particularly with respect to small businesses and rural
communities, and their continued health and vitality is central to the nation's economic
recovery."); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed to
Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 249, 289 ("Community banks have a superior ability to assess and monitor local
firms because their managers and loan officers generally have long tenures in their
positions and are deeply involved in the life of their communities."); Marshall Lux & Robert
Greene, The State and Fate of Community Banking 4-5 (Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus.
and Gov't, Harv. Kennedy Sch., Assoc. Working Paper No. 37, 2015), available at http://

www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/74695/1687293/version/l/file/Final-State-and-Fate
LuxGreene.pdf (noting that community banks are better than large banks at serving
small businesses in rural areas because they heavily rely on personal relationships with
lenders to make lending decisions); Hester Pierce et al., How are Small Banks Faring
Under Dodd-Frank? 11 (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-05,
2014), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/defaultfiles/Peirce-SmallBankSurvey-v.pdf
("[S]mall banks are particularly important as agricultural lenders and small-business
lenders." (internal quotations omitted)).
24 For a discussion of relationship banking, see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-13-71, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF RECENT BANK
FAILURES 8 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets660/651154.pdf; Arnoud W.A.
Boot, Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?, 9 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 7 (2000).
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bank assets, but they provide 48.1 percent of small
business lending, 43.8 percent of farm loans, 42.8
percent of farmland loans, 34.7 percent of commercial
real estate lending, and 15.7 percent of residential
mortgage loans and hold 20.1 percent of retail
deposits .25
Marsh and Norman also illustrate the importance of community
banks in providing banking services to certain rural areas. They
found that community banks were the only banks offering services
26
in one-third of the underserved counties in the United States.
Given the significant benefits offered by community banks, the
dramatic decrease in their number is a matter of concern. The
number of community banks has fallen from 14,408 in 1984 to
6,356 in 2011.27 The traditional reasons cited for this sharp
More
decline include mergers, consolidations, and failures. 28
recently, focus has turned to the impact of new and existing
regulations. In the post-Financial Crisis environment, observers
have pointed to an increased cost of compliance coupled with low
29
interest rates as the reason for the dearth of new bank charters.
As reported in a recent Federal Reserve Board study, from 1990 to
2008, over 2,000 new banks were formed. 30 Yet, from 2009 to
2013, only seven new banks received charters. 31 This study
considered the impact of new regulations since the Financial Crisis
and whether the burden of such regulation was the cause of the
decline in new bank charters. The study concluded that the weak

25

MARSH & NORMAN, supranote 23, at 20.

26

Id.

27

28

FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 9, at 2-6.
See id. at I-II (discussing trends in banking consolidation, including the role of bank

failures and mergers).
29 Thomas Heath, The Long Odds of Starting a Local Bank: Recession, Interest Rates
Deplete Ranks, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/busi
ness/capitalbusiness/the-long-odds-of-starting-a-local-bank-recession-interest-rates-deplete-ra
nks/2015/03/271fedd2194-d729-1le4-a62f-ee74591la455_story.htm.
30 Robert M. Adams & Jacob P. Gramlich, Where Are All the New Banks? The Role of
Regulatory Burden in New Charter Creation1 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Fed. Reserve
Bd., Working Paper No. 2014-113, 2014).
31 Id.
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economy and low interest rate environment are primarily to blame
would have occurred
and that the decrease in new charters
32
burden.
regulatory
in
increase
an
without
Whether or not an increase in regulation has depressed the rate
of new bank-chartering, the regulatory burden on community
banks is an important consideration. Complying with regulations
and submitting to prudential supervision is costly.3 3 Such costs
could strain the community bank's profitability and, therefore,
viability. Therefore, the purpose and nature of community bank
regulation can appropriately be scrutinized.
III. WHY REGULATE COMMUNITY BANKS?
With all the focus on large "systemically important" financial
institutions in the wake of the Financial Crisis, the reasons for
regulating small, not systemically important financial institutions
can sometimes get lost in the shuffle. Long before the terms TBTF
or systemically important were ever coined, we had a system of
prudential regulation (also known as "safety and soundness"
regulation) for banks-large and small. 34 Prudential regulation of
banks seeks to protect banks from failure, and the rationale for
such regulation was and remains based on the importance of
banks to the overall economy, coupled with their inherent fragility.
The importance of banks derives from the services they provide
customers in the form of both payments and liquidity. 35 The
fragility of banks stems from the maturity transformation that
32

See id.

3 See FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 9, at B-1 to B-3 (describing

interviews with nine community bankers detailing the cost of complying with regulation
supervision).
3 See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to
Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 53 (2005) (discussing prudential
regulation in the United States, which was primarily developed through Depression-Era
laws). The first federal bank regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, was
established in 1863. History: 150 Years of the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-dolhistory/index-history.html (last visited
Sept. 14, 2015).
35 For the classic exploration of banks' special role in the economy, see FED. RESERVE
BANK OF MINN., ANNUAL REPORT 1982: ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1982), available at https://
www.minneapolisfed.orglpublications/annual-reports/ar/annual-report- 1982-complete-text.
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they provide, i.e., banks transform short-term liabilities (e.g., bank
deposits) into long-term assets (e.g., mortgage loans). Importantly,
the prudential regulation of banks can be distinguished from other
types of financial regulation such as those regulations that are
meant to protect bank customers. In fact, one of the rationales for
creating a separate federal agency, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), to administer consumer protection
regulation was the recognition that consumer protection is
different from prudential regulation (although they can overlap). 36
As discussed, the focus of prudential regulation is to limit the
costliness of bank failure. In the context of community banks,
there are good reasons to conclude that the failure of even small
banks can be damaging to a local economy (i.e., decreased credit
availability and loss of jobs).37 At the same time, there are also
reasons to suspect that the consequences of the failure of a
community bank may be relatively minimal. As noted by Kandrac
in a recent study, FDIC deposit insurance, bank resolution by
purchase and assumption, and the rise of technology that replaces
the advantages of geography might all lead to the conclusion that
community bank failures are not so worrisome. 38 Despite this
hypothesis, Kandrac's study supports the traditional conclusion
that the failure of small banks is highly disruptive to communities.
In a study of bank failures from 2008 to 2010, Kandrac found that
such failures "lead to lower income and compensation growth,
higher poverty rates, and lower employment." 39
Moreover,
Wilmarth discusses the less obvious negative impact on nonprofit
40
and other service organizations when community banks fail.

36 For a general and comprehensive discussion of the foundations for consumer protection
versus prudential regulation and a discussion of assignment of regulatory responsibilities
among federal agencies, see Schooner, supra note 34.
37 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
38 John Kandrac, Bank Failure,Relationship Lending, and Local Economic Performance
2 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2014-41, 2014).
39 Id. at 1.
40 See Wilmarth, supra note 23, at 290 n.153 (providing an overview of the import to
service organization of community banks).
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In 2013, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) also
41
studied the impact of small bank failures on local communities.
The GAO reported that "[a]ccording to banks in urban and rural
areas in the three states that we interviewed, acquisitions of failed
small banks mitigated some potential negative effects on the cost
and availability of credit and on philanthropic contributions in
these communities." 42 The GAO also found that "the impact of
bank failures on a state's economy is most likely to appear in the
real estate sector and are [sic] less likely to appear in the overall
43
labor market or in the broader economy."
In addition to the potential harm caused to communities by the
failure of a small bank, consideration must be given to the access
of small banks to the government safety net. While community
and other small banks are not, by definition, TBTF, they do receive
considerable government support. All banks in the United States
benefit from the availability of federal deposit insurance, and the
expansion of deposit insurance under Dodd-Frank from the
general coverage limit of $100,000 in deposits to $250,000
certainly benefited community banks. 44 In addition, all banks
enjoy borrowing privileges at the Federal Reserve's discount
window. 45 Finally, and perhaps most important in the postFinancial Crisis narrative, many community banks received taxAsset
appropriated government support through the Troubled
46
Crisis.
Financial
the
during
(TARP)
Program
Relief

41

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24.

42

Id. at 51.

43 Id. at 55.
44 See Press Release, FDIC, Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage Permanently Increased to

$250,000 Per Depositor (July 21, 2010), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/prlOl
61.html (noting the expansion of federal deposit insurance).
45 Regulation A sets forth eligibility for borrowing from the Federal Reserve. 12 C.F.R.

§ 201 (2015).
46 For a discussion of community banks' participation in TARP and their challenges
exiting that program, see SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, TARP AND SBLF: IMPACT ON COMMUNITY BANKS (2012), https://www.sigtarp.gov/
Audit%20Reports/TARPSBLFSpecial-Section.pdf.
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IV. WHY COMMUNITY BANKS FAIL

Given the importance of community banks' operations and
access to government support, an examination of the reasons for
their insolvency is important to any regulatory discussion. The
United States has a longstanding and highly cyclical experience
with bank failure. The United States has experienced periods of
significant failures. In the five-year period after the FDIC was
created, 1934 to 1938, 252 banks failed. 47 From 1987 to 1991,
1,629 banks failed. 48 Recently, from 2009 to 2013, 464 banks
failed. 49 The United States has also seen periods of very low
50
incidents of bank failure. In 2005 and 2006, no banks failed.
And, in 1945, 1946, 1957, 1960, 1962, and 1997, only one bank
failed during each of those years. 51 Bank failures can result in
significant losses to the FDIC's deposit insurance fund. Even after
the worst years of the Financial Crisis had passed, the FDIC's
annual losses ran in the billions of dollars, and all such recent
52
failures involved small depository institutions.
The FDIC's Community Banking Study points to data on bank
failures as a measure of community banks' resiliency. Community
banks failed at the same rate as noncommunity banks in the

47

FDIC,

FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE TRANSACTIONS: NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS, US AND

OTHER AREAS, 1934-1938, https://www5.fdic.govlhsob/ (follow "Failures and Assistance
Transactions" hyperlink; then search "1934" and "1938" as "Effective Date(s)").
48 FDIC, FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE TRANSACTIONS: NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS, US AND
OTHER AREAS, 1987-1991, https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/ (follow "Failures and Assistance

Transactions" hyperlink; then search "1987" and "1991" as "Effective Date(s)").
49 FDIC, FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE TRANSACTIONS: NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS, US AND

OTHER AREAS, 2009-2013, https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/ (follow "Failures and Assistance
Transactions" hyperlink; then search "2009" and "2013" as "Effective Date(s)").
50 FDIC, FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE TRANSACTIONS: NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS US AND

OTHER AREAS 2005-2006, https://www5.fdic.govlhsob/ (follow "Failures and Assistance
Transactions" hyperlink; then search "2005" and "2006" as "Effective Date(s)").
51 FDIC, FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE TRANSACTIONS: NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS US AND

OTHER AREAS 1945-1997, https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/ (follow "Failures and Assistance
Transactions" hyperlink; then search "1945" and "199T' as "Effective Date(s)").
52 Losses to the deposit insurance fund in recent years were as follows: $.4 billion in 2014;
$1.2 billion in 2013; $2.7 billion in 2012; and $7.9 billion in 2011. See 2014 FDIC ANN. REP.
19; 2013 FDIC ANN. REP. 14; 2012 FDIC ANN. REP. 14; 2011 FDIC ANN. REP. 11, https://
www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/.
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period studied by the FDIC, 1984 to 2011. 53 The FDIC also
considered banks' failure index, which compares the frequency of
failure within one group of banks with the failure of all banks in a
given period. 54 Considering the failure index in five-year periods
from 1986 to 2011, community banks had a lower failure index for
all five-year periods except the period of 1986-1990. 55 During that
period, community banks had a failure index of 1.05 and
noncommunity banks had a significantly lower failure index

of 0.71.56
The GAO studied bank failures in the ten states with ten or
more bank failures during 2008 to 2011.57 The GAO found that
the failure of small- and medium-sized banks was primarily driven
by high concentrations of commercial real estate (CRE) loans, in
particular acquisition, development, and construction loans
(ADC).58 Small banks that did not fail in that period had slower
growth of ADC loans. 59 Concentrations of CRE loans in failed
institutions also correlated to poor risk management (e.g., poor
oversight, weak underwriting, and inadequate allowances for loan
losses) and risky funding sources (e.g., brokered deposits). 60 The
FDIC Inspector General's study, covering 2008 to 2011, found:
"The majority of community banks failed as a result of aggressive
growth, asset concentrations, poor underwriting, and deficient
61
credit administration coupled with declining real estate values."
A significant number of banks have failed since the FDIC and
the GAO's study of bank failures. In 2012, 51 banks failed; in
2013, 24 banks failed; and, in 2014, 18 banks failed. 62 Federal law
53 FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, supra note 9, at 2-11.
54 Id.

55 Id. at 2-10 tbl.2.5, 2-11.
56 Id. at 2-10 tbl.2.5.
57 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24.
58 Id. at 15, 18-25.
59 Id. at 18.

6oId. at 19-21.
61 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
FDIC, EVAL-13-002, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
COMPREHENSIVE

STUDY

ON THE IMPACT

OF THE

FAILURE

OF INSURED DEPOSITORY

INSTITUTIONS, at iii (2013), https:lwww.fdicig.govlreportsl3/13-OO2EV.pdf.
62 Failed Bank List, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/banklindividual/failedlbacklist.html
visited Sept. 13, 2015).

(last
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requires an ex post review of any bank failure that results in a
material loss to the FDIC's deposit insurance fund, called material
loss review (MLR). 63 MLRs are conducted by the Inspector
General (IG) of the appropriate federal banking agency. 64 The
MLRs for Tennessee Commerce Bank (TCB), a bank with $1
billion in assets that closed on January 27, 2012,65 and for First
State Bank (FSB), a bank with $528.7 million in assets that closed
on January 20, 2012,66 provide interesting case studies. According
the FDIC's IG report, the failure of FSB is consistent with the
GAO study discussed above. FSB failed because its management
failed to effectively manage its high concentration of CRE loan
portfolio, in particular, residential ADC projects. 67 The story of
TCB, however, is another matter. TCB employed a non-traditional
banking business model; it was a "business bank" without
branches or branching services. 68 The bank financed its operations
with Internet and brokered deposits and with capital from its
The bank's lending activities were
holding company. 69
significantly concentrated in the transportation industry,
including loans to leasing companies and lease brokers for the
financing of commercial use vehicles.7 0 The FDIC's IG concluded
that TCB failed because of ineffective risk management of "large
and complex borrowing relationships" and reliance on "non-core

63 See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k) (2012) (explaining when material loss occurs, MLR is
triggered). Originally, the statute defined a material loss to the deposit insurance fund as
the greater of $25 million or 2% of the bank's total assets. 12 U.S.C. § 18310(k)(B) (2006).
The statute was amended to define material loss for the period from January 1, 2010 to
December 31, 2011 as greater than $200 million; for January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2013
as greater than $150 million; and on or after January 1, 2014, as greater than $50 million.
Id. § 1831o(k)(2)(B).
64 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k)(1) (2012).
65

OFFICE OF AUDITS AND EVALUATIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FDIC AUD-12-

014, MATERIAL Loss REVIEW OF TENNESSEE COMMERCE BANK, FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE, at 1-2

(2012) [hereinafter TCB], https://www.fdicig.gov/reportsl2%5C12-014AUD.pdf.
66 OFFICE OF AUDITS AND EVALUATIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FDIC, AUJD-12013, MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF THE FIRST STATE BANK, STOCKBRIDGE, GEORGIA, at I-i

(2012), https://www.fdicig.gov/reportsl2%5C12-013AUD.pdf.
67 Id. at 1-3.
66 TCB, supra note 65, at 1-3.
69 Id. at 1-5.
70

Id.
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funding sources." 7 1 TCB caused a $416.8 million loss to the FDIC
insurance fund. 72 TCB provides an example of a bank that, while
relatively small in asset size, chose the kinds of operations that
are more often found in larger institutions. Apparently, because
TCB failed to manage those operations appropriately, the FDIC
was left with significant losses when the bank was closed. The
experience of an institution like TCB forms the background for
discussions of regulatory relief for smaller banks.
V. DODD-FRANK AND CALLS FOR REFORM

It comes as no surprise that Dodd-Frank is unpopular with the
financial services industry. Certainly among community bankers,
this sentiment runs deep and has led to calls for reform. A 2013
joint study by the Federal Reserve and the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors identified regulation as a frequently cited
challenge. 73 That study found:
Many bankers felt that the move toward standardized
products and a "one-size-fits-all" supervisory approach
were taking away one of the strongest advantages of
community banks: the ability to tailor products to fit
individualized needs.... Bankers also noted increased

regulatory scrutiny and costs.

74
....

Other studies support the need for regulatory reform. Lux and
Greene conclude: "Our findings appear to validate concerns that
an increasingly complex and uncoordinated regulatory system has
created an uneven regulatory playing field that is accelerating
75
consolidation for the wrong reasons."
Congress demonstrated sensitivity to the regulatory burden on
smaller institutions in the passage of Dodd-Frank. In discussions
leading to the creation of the new Consumer Financial Protection
71
72

Id. at 1-6.
Id. at 1-2.

73 FED. RESERVE & CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 23, at 15.
74

Id.

75 Lux & Greene, supranote 23, at 3.
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Bureau (CFPB) in 2010, community bankers expressed dismay
over the addition of a federal regulator that would subject them to
periodic examination. 76 Congress responded to such complaints by
excluding banks with assets of $10 billion or less from CFPB
supervision (although small banks are still subject to the CFPB's
rules). 77 In addition, the enhanced supervisory regime established
by Congress under Dodd-Frank only applies to bank holding
companies with assets of $50 billion or more. 78 Moreover, DoddFrank's annual stress test requirement only applies to institutions
79
with more than $10 billion in assets.
Since the passage of Dodd-Frank, regulatory agencies have also
demonstrated willingness to consider the particular situation of
community and small banks in promulgating new rules. The
CFPB exempted banks with assets of $2 billion or less from its
ability-to-repay (ATR) and qualifying mortgage (QM) rules.80 The
Federal Reserve Board excluded banks with assets of less than $10
billion from the new liquidity coverage ratio. 8 1 In addition to
specific exemptions for smaller banks, bank regulators have made
76 See Damian Paletta, Fight Over Consumer Agency Looms as Overhaul Is Signed, WALL
ST. J. (updated July 22, 2010, 12:01 AM), http:l/www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870
4746804575367502836650966 (noting that many bankers opposed the creation of a financial
consumer protection agency).
77 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515-5516 (2012).
78 Id. § 5365(a).
79 Id. § 5365(i)(2). At the same time, bank regulators encourage community banks to
utilize stress testing as part of their sound risk management practices. OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BULLETIN 2012-33,
COMMUNITY BANK STRESS TESTING (2012), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/201
2/bulletin-2012-33.html; see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYs., FDIC & OFFICE
OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, STATEMENT TO CLARIFY SUPERVISORY
EXPECTATIONS FOR STRESS TESTING BY COMMUNITY BANKS (2012), https://www.fdic.gov/ne
ws/news/press/2012/pr12054a.pdf ("[C]ommunity banks are not required or expect to
conduct [certain stress tests] ... [but] all banking organizations, regardless of size, should
have the capacity to analyze the potential impact of adverse outcomes on their financial
condition.").
80 See Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Finalizes Amendments to Ability to Pay Rule (May 29,
2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-finalizes-amendments-toability-to-rep
ay-rule/. The ATR/QM rules generally require a lender to make a reasonable, good faith
determination that the customer can repay the loan prior to extending credit. See Ability to
Repay & Qualified Mortgages, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/tech
nical/atr.html.
81 12 C.F.R. § 329.1(b)(iii) (2012).
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a demonstrative effort to ease the compliance burden on
community banks by providing resources tailored to such
institutions. For example, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and the
OCC published a "Community Bank Guide" outlining changes in
capital rules. The purpose of the guide is "to help small, noncomplex community banking organizations understand the
sections of the [new] capital rule ...most relevant to their
operations."8 2 More broadly, the FDIC has produced a program of
videos, available on their website and the FDIC's YouTube
channel, to assist in the education of bank officers, directors, and
employees in many areas of regulation and supervision.8 3
Of course, despite this apparent sensitivity to regulatory
burden, new regulations imposed by Dodd-Frank added to an
existing and heavy regulatory burden. For this reason, proposals
for reform to ease the burden on community banks have
proliferated. While this Article makes no attempt to canvas all
reform proposals, the following lists some of the more recent and
visible ones.
Not surprisingly, the Independent Community
Bankers of America (ICBA) has published a comprehensive list of
reform proposals.8 4 A well-known, bipartisan bill introduced by
Senators Sherrod Brown and David Vitter to eliminate TBTF
policies also includes various forms of regulatory relief for
community banks.8 5 The OCC86 has submitted proposals to
Congress for reform to address regulatory burdens on community

82

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., FDIC & OCC, NEW CAPITAL RULE:

COMMUNITY BANK GUIDE 1 (2013), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/2
013-110b.pdf.
83 Technical Assistance Video Program, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/direct
or/video.html (last updated Nov. 4, 2015).
84 ICBA, PLAN FOR PROSPERITY: A REGULATORY RELIEF AGENDA TO EMPOWER LOCAL

COMMUNITIES (2013). The ICBA plan includes proposals for relief from mortgage rules,
reform of bank examinations, and many other proposals. Id. at 1-2.
85 See Terminating Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness Act of 2013, S. 798, 113th Cong. § 6
(2013) (including provisions intended to reduce the regulatory burden for smaller financial
institutions).
86 The OCC is the primary federal regulator for all federally chartered banks. About the
OCC, OCC, http://www.occ.gov/aboutlwhat-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited Nov.
6, 2015).
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87
banks, including limitations to the scope of the Volcker rule,
revisions to examination schedules, and changes to permissible
88
activities for federal savings associations. Federal Reserve Board
Governor Daniel K. Tarullo has also suggested consideration 8of9
amendments to the Volcker rule in favor of community banks.
Finally, former FDIC Chair Sheila Bair offered a broad legislative
proposal that would "giv[e] [bank] regulators the power to exempt
institutions with less than $10 billion of assets from existing or
new regulations." 90
These reform proposals are worthy of serious and careful
consideration. This Article does not attempt to weight the costs
and benefits of any particular proposal. Rather, the discussion
that follows highlights the importance of emphasizing the
underlying purpose of prudential regulation of community banks
in discussions regarding regulatory relief.
As
Not all financial regulations serve the same purpose.
lumped
discussed in Part III, financial regulation can be roughly
into two categories: regulations that protect customers (consumer
protection regulations) and regulations that protect the
91
institutions' solvency (prudential regulations). The distinction is

87 Congress enacted the Volcker Rule under Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)). The
Volcker rule prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading and from
certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)
(2012). The purpose of the Volcker Rule, among other things, is to restrict banks from
engaging in highly profitable and yet highly risky activities while at the same time enjoying
access to the federal safety net. A Senate Report found: 'The prohibitions in section 619
therefore will reduce potential taxpayer losses at institutions protected by the federal safety
net, and reduce threats to financial stability, by lowering their exposure to risk." S. REP.
NO. 111-176, at 8 (2010).
88 For a discussion of these legislative proposals and other issues relevant to community
banks, see Regulatory Relief for Community Banks and Credit Unions: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. And Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Toney
Bland, Sr. Dep'y Comptroller for Midsize and Comm'y Bank Supervision, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency).
89 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
Community Bankers Symposium: A Tiered Approach to Regulation and Supervision of
Community Banks (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.federareserve.gov/newsevents/
speechturullo20141107a.pdf.
90 Blackwell, supra note 6.
91 Of course, there is plenty of overlap between these categories.
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relevant because of the distinct harms addressed by these different
regulatory regimes. A consumer protection regulation that is
appropriate but only serves to protect a very small group of
hypothetical bank customers may not be worth the cost of
compliance, whereas a costly prudential regulation may be
justified because its purpose is to protect the broader economy. Of
course, the reverse is also potentially true. Some consumer
protection rules protect vast numbers of bank customers and some
prudential rules may have only a minor positive impact on bank
solvency. The point is that careful consideration must be given to
the underlying purpose of the regulation.
Perhaps most importantly, reform proposals geared toward
community banks sometimes lose sight of the justifications for
prudential regulation of such institutions. Objections to the
application of the Volcker Rule to community banks provide a
useful example. Community banks 92 have complained about the
application of the Volcker Rule, which as discussed limits
proprietary trading and certain relationships with hedge funds
and private equity funds. 93 While it is likely that the Volcker
Rule does not apply to most community banks' operations, 94
opponents of the rule claim that it nevertheless imposes a

92 It is worth noting that larger banks do not like the Volcker Rule either.
And,
sometimes, commentators confuse complaints from larger institutions with those of smaller
ones. An article in the New Republic about objections to the Volcker Rule ran the following
headline: "A Small Bank in Utah Has Launched Wall Street's War on the Volcker Rule."
David Dayen, A Small Bank in Utah Has Launched Wall Street's War on the Volcker Rule,
NEw REPUBLIC (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116054Nolcker-rule-la
wsuit-small-banks-sue-undo-financial-regulation. The bank covered in the article is Zions
Bancorp, a regional bank with operations based in Salt Lake City. Id. Zions Bancorp is
only a "small" bank when compared with the top few extremely large institutions, e.g., Bank
of America, JP Morgan, etc., but Zions Bancorp has approximately $50 billion in assets and
is therefore very unlikely, under any definition, to be considered a small or community
bank. See ZION Company Financials,NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/zion/finance
ials?query=balance-sheet (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
93 See supranote 87 and accompanying text.
9
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE, FDIC & OCC, THE VOLCKER RULE:
COMMUNITY BANK APPLICABILITY 1 (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefedlboard

meetingslVolcker-rule-community-bank-20131210.pdf ('The vast majority of... community
banks have little or no involvement in prohibited proprietary trading or investment
activities in covered funds.").
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significant compliance burden. 95 While it is tempting to dismiss
such complaints as overblown (should not community banks know
whether or not, for example, they are engaged in proprietary
trading?), compliance with highly complex regulations can turn
even the determination that a regulation does not apply into a
costly exercise. Therefore, consideration of the short- and longterm costs of the Volcker Rule are certainly worthy discussions.
Yet, such discussions should not distract from the overall purpose
of the rule. Congress adopted the Volcker Rule to prevent FDIC
insured banks (and their affiliates) from engaging in activities
that, while highly profitable, could pose risks to the government
safety net. 96 While it may be true that most community banks are
not engaged in such activities, if they were, there is no reason why
they should be exempt from the rule. The Volcker Rule prevents
banks from using cheap, government-subsidized funding (FDIC
insured deposits) for their own profit (as opposed to the gain of
bank customers). 97 If that rule prevents large banks from reaping
such profits, it seems that it should apply equally to smaller
institutions.
While reform discussions at times lose sight of the underlying
purpose of the prudential regulation of community banks (i.e., the
insolvency risk of community banks), such discussions have not
often accounted for the different risks posed by community banks
(i.e., not all community banks pose the same solvency risk). In
other words, discussions of lower regulatory burden have not
adequately considered the differences among community banks by
distinguishing between those that will and will not be likely to
require government support. As a point of reference, consider that
when Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
(GLB), 98 it devised a system that enabled certain bank holding
companies to engage in expanded, non-bank financial activities
(e.g., securities and insurance activities) if an institution was

95 See supranotes 87-90 and accompanying text.
- See supra note 87.
97 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
98

Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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deemed "well managed" and "well capitalized." 99 While these
particular provisions of GLB benefit primarily larger institutions
with more sophisticated operations, the same sort of regime might
be applied to reduce the regulatory burden of community banks.
Along the lines of Sheila Bair's proposal referenced above,100 it
might be useful to consider a regime in which bank regulators are
granted the authority to exempt smaller institutions from certain
regulations upon determination that such institutions were well
managed and well capitalized. Such exemptive authority would
balance the need for reduced regulatory burden against the need
to protect the federal safety net.
VI. CONCLUSION

Community banks offer many important services to our
communities. The declining numbers of such institutions should
not be ignored. While community banks will hopefully thrive as
the economy continues to improve, lawmakers should continue
efforts to reduce overreaching regulation. Yet, the justification for
the prudential regulation of community banks remains even in an
era in which very large institutions demand greater attention.
Like larger financial institutions, community banks are highly
leveraged institutions with significant access to the government
safety net. Therefore, reform proposals must be balanced against
the need to limit community banks' failure and, thereby, their
access to government support.

99 See

id. at sec. 103, § (1)(1), 13 Stat. at 1346 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1)(1) (2012)); see

also id.§ 121(a)(2), 113 Stat. at 1373 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24(a)(2)(C) (2012)) (providing
similar restrictions on expanded activities for national banks).
100 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

